Whipping Up a Storm: Trying to Make Sense of Constitutional Law by Hutchinson, Allan C.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal 
Volume 56 
Issue 3 Volume 56, Issue 3 (Summer 2020) Article 5 
12-16-2020 
Whipping Up a Storm: Trying to Make Sense of Constitutional Law 
Allan C. Hutchinson 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Book Review 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative 
Works 4.0 License. 
Citation Information 
Hutchinson, Allan C.. "Whipping Up a Storm: Trying to Make Sense of Constitutional Law." Osgoode Hall 
Law Journal 56.3 (2020) : 659-676. 
https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol56/iss3/5 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons. 
Whipping Up a Storm: Trying to Make Sense of Constitutional Law 
Abstract 
The effort to make sense out of what the judges of any Supreme Court do is all the more pressing and 
acute in times of political turbulence. Lawrence Lessig’s Fidelity and Constraint offers itself as one such 
effort to distinguish constitutional decision-making from “the ad hoc in politics” by its reliance upon 
principled and neutral reasons; it is the judges’ detached and professional nature that underwrites their 
democratic legitimacy and institutional commitment. This review challenges those claims and 
demonstrates how Lessig’s analysis does more to undermine that project than achieve it. 
Creative Commons License 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 
License. 
Cover Page Footnote 
I am grateful to Richard Albert, Ben Berger, Richard Devlin, Richard Haigh, Jennifer Leitch, Thomas 
Lundmark, Mark Tushnet, and other friends and colleagues for critical assistance and intellectual support. 




Whipping Up a Storm: Trying to Make 
Sense of Constitutional Law
ALLAN C. HUTCHINSON1
Fidelity and Constraint: How the 
Supreme Court Has Read the American 
Constitution, by Lawrence Lessig2
The effort to make sense out of what the judges of any Supreme Court do is all the more 
pressing and acute in times of political turbulence. Lawrence Lessig’s Fidelity and Constraint 
offers itself as one such effort to distinguish constitutional decision-making from “the ad 
hoc in politics” by its reliance upon principled and neutral reasons; it is the judges’ detached 
and professional nature that underwrites their democratic legitimacy and institutional 
commitment. This review challenges those claims and demonstrates how Lessig’s analysis 
does more to undermine that project than achieve it.
TRYING TO MAKE SENSE out of what the judges of any Supreme Court do is an 
enduring preoccupation of lawyers and jurists. This is especially so in the United 
States. This is no mere academic indulgence as the Court’s work has a deep and 
lasting impact on many aspects of the American polity and society. Whether 
by way of grand theorizing or through case-by-case criticisms, academics and 
1. Distinguished Research Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University. I am grateful 
to Richard Albert, Ben Berger, Richard Devlin, Richard Haigh, Jennifer Leitch, Thomas 
Lundmark, Mark Tushnet, and other friends and colleagues for critical assistance and 
intellectual support.
2. (Oxford University Press, 2019) 581 [Lessig].
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commentators have sought to understand and handle the tensions between power 
and principle, politics and personnel, tradition and change, and much else in the 
work of the Court. Of course, this challenge is all the more pressing and acute 
in times of political turbulence; the age of Trump has exacerbated an already 
difficult and divisive issue. In such contemporary circumstances, therefore, for 
good and bad, the appointment and performance of the Supreme Court’s nine 
justices are thrust further into the critical spotlight; their credentials and their 
bona fides are subject to even greater scrutiny and pressure from both inside and 
outside the academy.
Occasioned by the fragile democratic legitimacy of the Supreme Court, 
Herbert Wechsler’s challenge still casts a long shadow over those presuming to 
explain the apparent mysteries of Supreme Court decision-making in modern 
constitutional law—to demonstrate how judges perform their task in a way that 
is distinguishable from “the ad hoc in politics” by their reliance upon principled 
reasons that “in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate 
result that is involved.”3 And, it might be added, transcending any immediate 
political agenda that is involved. Lawrence Lessig places himself squarely with 
this Wechsler camp. For him, it is the judges’ detached and professional nature 
that underwrites their democratic legitimacy and institutional commitment: 
They can engage with ideological politics, but not be consumed or captured by 
it. Fidelity and Constraint is devoted to accomplishing this delicate and difficult 
task as a matter of both historical practice as well as normative imperative.
I. LESSIG IS MORE
It is to Lawrence Lessig’s credit that he has entered this hectic fray and taken 
on the daunting challenge of explaining the wiles and workings of the Supreme 
Court. But, as anyone familiar with Lessig’s other writings know, his intervention 
is guaranteed to be as ambitious and challenging as it is disconcerting and 
disturbing. In this regard, Fidelity and Constraint does not disappoint. It is a 
no half-measures and no-stone-unturned work of enormous erudition, sparkling 
insight, and provocative apercus. While it is conversational and relaxed in style 
and presentation, it is far from conventional or casual in its approach and 
conclusions. In revisiting the received wisdom on the history of constitutional 
law, he rewrites it. After reading Fidelity and Constraint, that history will not be 
3. Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law” (1959) 73 Harv 
L Rev 1 at 15, 19. For the best survey of the different approaches, see Thomas E Baker, 
“Constitutional Theory in a Nutshell” (2004) 13 Wm & Mary Bill Rts J.
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viewed or understood in the same way again. With its broad sweep and nuanced 
depth, it is likely as close to a jurisprudential page-turner as you could hope to 
read. Lessig can both soar with the theoretical eagles and get his hands dirty 
with the practical grubs. If “administrative law is not for cissies,”4 then Lessigian 
constitutional law is only for those who can stomach high-risk thrills and spills 
in the hope of experiencing some kind of intellectual apotheosis. It is a genuinely 
provocative performance by a singular talent.
That said, if you fly as high and as far as Lessig does, you are likely to crash 
and burn on more than one occasion. That is certainly the case in this book: His 
admirable refusal to play it safe ensures some spectacular flame-outs. However, 
that is not at all the main problem with his iconoclastic (or, to use one of Lessig’s 
own colourful terms, “funky”)5 approach to constitutional law and history. His 
self-imposed mission is to “provide an account that fits the data—the decisions 
by the US Supreme Court—while justifying the practice these data reveal.”6 Or, 
less formally, he offers a critical look at “the game we’ve been playing so far.”7 
In performing this unashamedly apologetic task, he treats judges as professional 
and principled officials, not as politicians in robes or “party hacks.”8 Indeed, 
a major part of his explanatory endeavour is to demonstrate that it is not only 
possible, but also has been the case that the Supreme Court has performed its 
work in a legitimate, predictable, and defensible way when looked at from his 
account’s point of view: “[T]he judge’s decision is based … upon law, … [not] 
upon politics (or craziness).”9
Yet, as I read it, Lessig’s powerful probing and reading of the American 
tradition of constitutional law produces exactly the opposite result—he provides 
a cogent and compelling argument that the work of the Supreme Court can be 
best understood and defended as an exercise in almost self-conscious political 
decision making. Once his unnecessarily narrow notion of what “politics” entails 
is developed and expanded, it becomes obvious and undeniable that the historical 
arc of constitutional adjudication and doctrine is significantly driven and defined 
by the dynamic forces of the informing political context. While the Supreme 
Court’s decisions might not follow the nation’s electoral returns, nor are its judges 
4. Antonin Scalia, “Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law” [1989] 
Duke LJ 511 at 511.
5. Lessig, supra note 2 at 38.
6. Ibid at 2.
7. Ibid at 4.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid at 17.
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considered “party hacks,”10 he argues that they never stray far from conventional 
political views or go against society’s extant deep-seated political commitments 
(for both good and bad). They might sometimes be slightly behind or ahead of 
these trends, but not by much. Except for the die-hard formalist, this is hardly 
surprising. But for Lessig and others like him, this presents a confounding 
challenge. For all the huff and puff of constitutional jurists and judges, it is not 
the text, context, interpretive strategy, or judicial role that energizes the twist and 
turns of constitutional doctrine, but its larger ideological framing at the time 
of its shaping and dependence—constitutional adjudication and doctrine is a 
mode of politics.
In this review, therefore, I will first provide the most charitable and faithful 
summary of Lessig’s account. After that, I will unpack it in more critical ways 
and turn the tables on Lessig. Rather than accept the force of his analysis and go 
along with his contention that to deny the reality of the constraints that operate 
on the Supreme Court is “to spit in the wind of what we all know is true,”11 
I will show that it is Lessig himself who has whipped up a hostile jurisprudential 
storm and tried to spit in its face. Throughout the review, my ambition is not 
to grapple with the detailed accuracy or fairness of Lessig’s historical accounts 
of individual cases or lines of doctrine: I leave that to those more qualified to 
judge and contest. My focus is upon the jurisprudential appeal, validity, overall 
sweep, and import of his account about the apparent constraints that demand 
and anchor Supreme Court judges’ fidelity to the Constitution. Insofar as they 
exist, they are political in nature and effect.
II. BLOWING IN THE WIND
Lessig offers “a kind of econometrics brought to constitutional theory.”12 
In an unexpected evocation of the late Ronald Dworkin,13 he offers his account 
of the American constitutional tradition and legal doctrine as “a story that makes 
10. Ibid at 4.
11. Ibid at 416.
12. Ibid at 2.
13. See e.g. Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 1986). It is a surprising 
reference as Lessig is adamant that he is not involved in offering a moral or prescriptive 
reading of the Constitution. The other two constitutional theorists that he commends are his 
Harvard colleagues, Cass R Sunstein and Richard Fallon. See Cass R Sunstein, Constitutional 
Personae: Heroes, Soldiers, Minimalists, and Mutes (Oxford University Press, 2015); Richard H 
Fallon, Jr, Law and Legitimacy in the Supreme Court (Harvard University Press, 2018).
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the most of the practice that we’re trying to understand.”14 Although he can be 
a little preachy at times, he does have the knack of telling a good story. Fidelity 
and Constraint is an appetizing, if daunting prospect. But he is not content to 
tell us what has been happening. He also suggests that, in making “the most” 
of it, he will be defending and justifying that practice as well. In telling this kind 
of story, Lessig seeks to tread a very thin line. He does not claim to provide a 
playbook for what judges should do or to establish moral or political standards 
against which to judge their decisions. What he does do is explain what the 
Supreme Court has been doing and put forward a defence of that historical 
practice. This is a tall order as much of the Supreme Court’s performance over 
the years has not always been uplifting or stellar. Indeed, many agree that it has 
been downright bad and embarrassing at times.
As the title of his book suggests, Lessig maintains that Supreme Court judges 
do and should fulfill their judicial responsibilities by following “the practice of 
interpretive fidelity.”15 In fleshing out this effort and traversing vast swathes of 
constitutional doctrine, he is in an extended and thinly veiled conversation with 
two of his main mentors, both Justice Antonin Scalia (for whom he clerked) 
and Professor Bruce Ackerman (with whom he was a student).16 Although he 
ultimately rejects the ideas and proposals of both, Lessig’s own account bears 
all the hallmarks of these two towering figures on the constitutional landscape; 
he offers important tweaks of both their work rather than an outright dismissal 
of them. As such, Fidelity and Constraint builds upon and advances many familiar 
motifs and tropes of contemporary constitutional theory. In particular, he looks 
to resist any particular pigeon-holing and claims that his account can make 
sense of both legal doctrine and jurisprudential insights on the political Right 
and Left. Lessig relies upon two primary tools or practices at work—meaning 
fidelity and role fidelity. The former draws upon the originalist tendency in legal 
hermeneutics and the latter draws on the institutional consideration of political 
science. Neither of these is new in either use or exposition; it is the way that they 
interact that gives his account its distinctive and original character.
In order to grasp the idea of meaning fidelity, Lessig works with a Scalian 
one-step originalism, but supplements it with a more creative second step. While 
traditional originalists ask themselves what the words of a particular constitutional 
14. Lessig, supra note 2 at 422.
15. Ibid at 18.
16. See Antonin Scalia & Bryan Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts (West 
Group, 2012); Bruce A Ackerman, We the People, vols 1-3 (Harvard University Press, 
1991, 1998, 2014).
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text mean, his neo-version asks how that text might be applied purposefully 
to a changed context. This, of course, can result in some varied and different 
renderings across and over time. For him, as he demonstrates in his colourful 
tour through the search and seizure doctrine,17 blind adherence to a text can be 
as wrong-headed and mistaken as a novel or even “aggressive” interpretation can 
be illuminating and valid.18 More to the point, creative translation can actually 
be more faithful to the original. For him, this kind of inspired judicial work is 
not at all an act of betrayal, but is more fruitfully understood as a renewal in 
the name of preservation: It remains faithful to the text’s original meaning, not 
only its words.19 Throughout Fidelity and Constraint, Lessig provides rich and 
subtle accounts of how Supreme Court judges have gone about their translating 
task in this sophisticated, originalist mode of interpretation.20 Indeed, it turns 
out that the originalist Scalia is the exception not the rule, even within the 
originalist canon.
Role fidelity operates along with meaning fidelity in the Lessigian 
constitutional order. By this, he intends to draw attention to how the Supreme 
Court has to recognize and respect its institutional limitations within a broader 
scheme of democratic governance. It is not for courts to usurp or trample on 
territory that is more appropriately trodden by the executive and legislative 
branches of government. For example, in the Constitution’s early days, Chief 
Justice Marshall solidified the Supreme Court’s role with an act of strategic 
“brilliance” in Marbury v Madison.21 By “bending” and “dissembling”22 the law, 
he committed “a sin,” but “a beautiful sin.”23 Similarly, in the 1930s, when the 
Supreme Court came under enormous presidential and popular pressure to change 
its jurisprudential tack,24 the judges took a similar institutional approach to that 
of Marshall, only this time it was done to preserve the Court’s role, not to establish 
it. As Lessig points out, “getting it right is important, but appearing non-political 
can be much more important”:25 There are occasions where the Supreme Court 
has given constitutional substance a back seat to institutional survival.
17. Lessig, supra note 2 at 259-70.
18. Ibid at 255.
19. See generally Jack Balkin, Living Originalism (Harvard University Press, 2011).
20. Lessig, supra note 2 at 49-69.
21. Ibid at 32, discussing Marbury v Madison, 5 US (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
22. Lessig, supra note 2 at 33, 43.
23. Ibid at 33.
24. Ibid at 160-72.
25. Ibid at 213.
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However, the heart of Lessig’s account is to be found in the way in which 
these two imperatives play off each other in a creative and sustaining tension: 
“[W]e can understand the evolution of Supreme Court doctrine as the product 
of the interaction between these two fidelities.”26 There is nothing innately 
conservative or progressive about how this has played out. Sometimes, role fidelity 
has compromised the obligation to pursue meaning fidelity as in recent efforts to 
turn back Roe v Wade.27 At other times, meaning fidelity has pushed the Court 
to act at the limits of its institutional competence and occasionally beyond them, 
as in Griswold v Connecticut.28 Indeed, Lessig is at his very best when he goes deep 
into in the historical thickets of constitutional doctrine to capture and describe 
this dynamic interaction. For instance, his evolutionary account of due process 
rulings from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century is an 
extended virtuoso performance that dances its way to stunning analytical effect 
over the ebb and flow of government regulation and its political underpinning.29 
In particular, he is entirely enlightening and convincing in showing how the 
Supreme Court shifted back and forth in its work between the pushes of meaning 
and the pulls of role in maintaining its overall constitutional faith. Accordingly, 
the history of legal doctrine has often been “the story of translations attempted, 
and then constraints of role realized.”30
As edifying as that account is, Lessig recognizes that, if he is to justify and 
not simply describe the pace and pattern of these doctrinal manoeuvres, he must 
pull back the curtain and look more keenly at the off-stage dynamics of the 
shifting constitutional and political contexts. After all, to justify the “separate, but 
equal”31 decades as being not only understandable, but acceptable is no easy feat. 
He does this by going beyond the internal workings of the Court and looking to 
the external context and forces within which the Court operates. For him, this 
entails an appreciation for the fact that “the Constitution gets read against the 
background of the dominant ideas of any age.”32 He insists that the work of the 
Supreme Court must be understood and appreciated in terms of prevailing values 
and commitments: He terms these as factual or reality-based constraints on the 
Court. To expect the Supreme Court to ignore or side-step these Holmesian 
26. Ibid at 71.
27. Ibid at 397-401, discussing Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973).
28. Ibid at 392-94, discussing Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
29. Ibid at 95-136.
30. Ibid at 232.
31. Plessy v Ferguson, 163 US 537 at 552 (1896) [Plessy].
32. Lessig, supra note 2 at 442.
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“felt necessities of the time”33 would be tantamount to expecting the Court “to 
spit into the wind of what everyone knows is true, whether or not that ‘truth’ 
conforms to what the framers might have thought.”34 Lessig commits himself to 
an account of the period between Plessy v Ferguson35 in 1896, to Brown v Board 
of Education36 in 1954, that acknowledges that racism was a fact of social life that 
the Supreme Court and its “normal judges” simply took for granted,37 no matter 
how reprehensible it may seem to later and more modern sensibilities:38
The social and political context is thus a constraint on constitutionalism. It is 
also a feature of constitutionalism, not a bug. It is an ongoing assurance that the 
Constitution will not become too remote. The key is to get help on any theory that 
treats context as compromise or an error, and instead build a theory that places 
context right in the middle.
 Accordingly, with this combination of internal and external constraints, 
Lessig defends the overall thrust and merit of his account by reference to its 
ultimately democratic character—if the Supreme Court were to abandon its 
practice of fidelity, it would disrupt the delicate balance of democratic powers 
and responsibilities: “[T]o the extent that propriety will be measured against the 
background of … public meaning, if the Court deviates from this background 
understanding, it risks its own institutional standing.”39 In this way, according 
to him, the Supreme Court’s practice of interpretive fidelity in both role and 
meaning can not only be accurately explained, but also convincingly justified. 
These are powerful and provocative claims; they warrant sustained attention and 
critical evaluation. After offering a more searching examination of his claim that 
“the judge’s decision is based … upon law …, [not] upon politics (or craziness),”40 
I will challenge his view that these judicial practices, no matter how accurately 
described, can be defended as legitimate and justified.
33. OW Holmes, Jr, The Common Law (Little, Brown, 1881) at 1.
34. Lessig, supra note 2 at 232.
35. Plessy, supra note 31.
36. 347 US 483 (1954).
37. Lessig, supra note 2 at 344-60.
38. Ibid at 456.
39. Ibid at 351. The argument here is similar to Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How 
Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 
(Farrar, Strauss, & Giroux, 2009).
40. Lessig, supra note 2 at 17.
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III. SPITTING IN THE WIND
There is a somewhat baffling progress to Lessig’s central argument. Although he 
begins with the self-imposed task of demonstrating that the Supreme Court can 
and does do its job as something separate and apart from politics, he ends Fidelity 
and Constraint with the clear admission that Supreme Court judges can and do 
engage in a profoundly political process when they craft their judgments and 
decisions. It is a long and winding road between “the judge’s decision is based … 
upon law …, [not] upon politics (or craziness)”41 and “the Constitution gets read 
against the background of the dominant ideas of any age.”42 As the old saw has 
it, it is difficult, if not impossible, for Lessig to get where he is going from where 
he starts. The critical challenge is to explain this crucial shift and its significance 
for his account.
The crucial issue for explaining this lies with the meaning of “politics.” 
Whether the Supreme Court’s work is or is not political depends upon what 
is meant by that term. Almost all agree that legal cases arise in socio-political 
contexts and that their resolution has an impact on those socio-political 
contexts.43 However, the mainstream view is that the Supreme Court’s actual 
judgment giving and decision making can be done healthily removed from those 
contexts. Few contend that there is no connection between decision and context; 
the disagreement is over the extent of that insulation or immersion. Lessig 
leans very much towards the insulation end of the jurisprudential spectrum. 
Throughout his account, he is adamant that judges do not act as “party hacks” 
or partisan[s].”44 But this is a very limited understanding of politics; there is more 
to politics than adherence to a Republican or Democratic party line and even 
that is far from uniform, let alone the same. Indeed, the explanation for Lessig’s 
apparent switch can be found in an expansive and more convincing grasp of what 
the claim that “law is politics” is about. Those who adopt such a stance, like me,45 
treat the Republican–Democrat split as a shallower and narrower segment of a 
much deeper and broader continuum. So understood, it brings Lessig well within 
the “law is politics” fold.
Lessig draws some important distinctions about the role of social values, 
political norms and ideological alignments in the adjudicative enterprise. One 
is that between contested issues “that normal people think normal people can 
disagree about” and uncontested issues that “normal people think normal 
people don’t disagree about.”46 He notes that something is contested not because 
“people, on average or frequently, contest it [but] … because within a particular 
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social context, people understand that normal people can disagree about it.”47 
For him, therefore, “normal” simply means mainstream—if you do disagree on 
some issues, then you are not normal and are outside the mainstream. So, while 
Republicans and Democrats are normal, presumably socialists and fascists are not. 
Of course, across time, what falls into the contested and uncontested boxes will 
change. While it was uncontested at the time of Plessy in 1896 that segregation 
was acceptable, this notion had switched around and become contested by the 
time of Brown in 1954.
Another important distinction for Lessig is that between foregrounded and 
backgrounded issues. Whereas the former are things that are presently talked 
about, the latter are not. In short, this is shorthand for tracking and describing 
“the activity of current social discourse.”48 Again, what is in each box will 
change over time. So, today, abortion is foregrounded and contentious, but 
sexual harassment is foregrounded and uncontested. On the other hand, while 
infanticide is backgrounded and uncontested, gay rights, at least in the 1970s, 
were backgrounded and contested. Taken together, these two distinctions do 
considerable work in grounding and defending Lessig’s account of Supreme 
Court judging and doctrine over the years. Indeed, they are the key to unlocking 
his claim that “law is not politics.”
For Lessig, constitutional judging takes place on the ground of these 
uncontested and backgrounded issues. He argues that these “social meanings 
are facts” and are simply taken-for-granted.49 As such, they not only require 
no argument in their defence, but also mark anyone who does contest them as 
outside the pale of serious attention. Importantly, the “normal judge,” like the 
normal person, will rely on these social facts, consciously or not. So, in going 
about their work, the normal judge will “fit in” with and become “well-adapted” 
to the prevailing social discourse and understandings around the issue to be 
adjudicated.50 In other words, they will not contest the presently uncontested or 
foreground what is presently backgrounded. Lessig hangs much of his account’s 
plausibility and cogency on the indubitable constraint of these social facts:51
Always the Court—including every justice—has yielded to “what we now 
understand” …. Democracy operates subject to certain constraints. The Constitution 
is one constraint. Reality is another. “What we now understand” … has formed a 
47. Ibid at 145-46.
48. Ibid at 146.
49. Ibid at 446.
50. Ibid at 154.
51. Ibid at 420.
HUTCHINSON,  WHIppINg Up A STOrm 669
critical constraint on the evolution of the Supreme Court’s doctrine. As ideas get 
thrown up for grabs, the Court’s readings of the Constitution changes …. Those 
changes are not simply politics. They are not simply the political preferences of 
a legal elite. They are a reality—one that the legal elite processes differently from 
the public, no doubt. But they are part of a social reality that our Constitution is 
subject to.
There is so much here that needs to be unpacked and held up for criticism. 
There may well be certain “realities” that operate on everyone’s mind, but it is 
difficult to view them as monolithic and fixed at any one point in time. As Lessig 
concedes, change occurs. But that change is not en bloc: The status quo or “what 
we now understand” is always on the move and is rarely as integrated as Lessig 
suggests. In a manner of speaking, it is always evolving in that the later reality 
grows out of the existing reality; the beginnings of the next era are in play, albeit 
barely and marginally, in the present era. So, again as regards racism, while the 
racist attitudes that generated and sustained Plessy-like views were dominant, 
they were not wall-to-wall or unchallenged; black Americans and their white 
allies (as Justice Harlan’s famous and sole dissent revealed)52 were not part of that 
social consensus. Moreover, as elite and powerful actors, Supreme Court judges 
were not beholden to such views, except as it either appealed to them or suited 
their need to preserve their institutional power. As such, although judges are part 
of the existing social fabric, they are also weavers and preservers of that fabric; 
they cannot absolve themselves of responsibility for maintaining racist or other 
oppressive attitudes and practices.
The upshot is that, while Supreme Court judges might not simply legislate 
their own Republican or Democratic preferences,53 they are influenced and driven 
by the larger socio-political views and forces in play. The very act of recognizing 
and identifying the contours of “current social discourse”54 and that “social and 
political context inevitably and appropriately plays a significant role”55 is profoundly 
political in that it involves choice and responsibility among contested alternatives 
about power and position in society; there is no uncontroversial or neutral way 
to fix that context with sufficient operational certainty. The only difference 
between contested and uncontested issues is not whether they are factual or not: 
52. Plessy, supra note 31 at 552-64.
53. It might well be that only the academic elite are sufficiently naïve to believe this. The recent 
shenanigans over the appointment of Supreme Court judges, like Neil Gorsuch and Brett 
Kavanaugh, suggest that the political elite and the public generally realize full well the 
political role and performance of the Supreme Court.
54. Lessig, supra note 2 at 146.
55. Ibid at 454 [emphasis in original].
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it is the visibility of each. Both are political and, therefore, not factual in the 
sense of having an indisputable there-ness. The uncontested are as political as 
the contested in that they represent always changing and, therefore, unreal or 
un-factual ideas; they both function at different levels of social acceptability and 
embeddedness. Lessig recognizes that when he observes that the Supreme Court’s 
work can be explained as “tracking the dynamic of an evolving social meaning” 
and that “as [social] understanding changes, the [constitutional] doctrine gets 
translated to track that change.”56
Although Lessig wants to pretend otherwise, Supreme Court judges are 
not as constrained as he claims they are or as his account demands if it is to 
be persuasive. Both “reality” and “the Constitution” are not things that operate 
entirely outside the realm of judicial choice, but are largely inside it. It is simply 
unconvincing to assert that judges act appropriately when they acknowledge the 
reality of social understandings and display because they “cannot spit into the wind 
of what everyone knows is true, whether or not that ‘truth’ conforms to what the 
framers might have thought.”57 This kind of “truth” signifies less a constraint, but 
more a felt necessity that only has obligatory force in the there-and-then; it has 
no free-standing moral or political pull outside of its informing and immediate 
social context. Accordingly, Lessig’s claim that “the Constitution gets read against 
the background of the dominant ideas of any age” is an acceptance, not an 
abandonment of the notion that the judicial development of constitutional law 
is at bottom a deeply and inescapably political process.58 If anyone is spitting in 
the wind, it is Lessig himself.
56. Ibid at 372, 375.
57. Ibid at 232.
58. Ibid at 442.
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IV. FLAPPING IN THE WIND
It is not only the larger political thrust of Lessig’s overall account that is based 
on politics. Even its more local and day-to-day understanding of what judges 
are doing and are supposed to be doing is infused with a deep political character 
and colouring. Following the dictates of meaning fidelity and role fidelity is not 
the straightforward or non-political task that Lessig imagines or portrays it to 
be. Indeed, the whole case-by-case practice of constitutional adjudication is less 
technical and professional and more political and contestable than it is conceded.
As a neo-originalist, Lessig runs into many of the problems that accompany 
any mode of originalist interpretation—variable historical records; shifting 
discursive meanings; intransigent collective intent; disparate worldviews; and 
the like.59 Indeed, his two-step approach to meaning fidelity seems to throw in 
a few extra difficulties for good measure. If it is taxing to locate the original 
intention behind the Constitution or the original public understanding of the 
Constitution’s text, it is no less demanding to capture the contemporary zeitgeist 
with any degree of confidence. Furthermore, once you add these two demanding 
practices together, it becomes beyond the grasp of even a super-human judge, let 
alone any “normal” judge. Consequently, despite the originalists’ claims to offer 
a viable escape from the tendency for judges (and jurists) to turn constitutional 
interpretation into a vehicle for ideological advocacy, the neo-originalists hide 
more than they reveal; there is a whiff of the mystical and mysterious about their 
craft. While there is nothing about the idea or practice of “textual translation” that 
is necessarily ideological (as it can be done by both Right and Left to serve their 
own ends), its performance in particular practical settings cannot be achieved 
without taking a stand on particular and divisive political issues and ideas.
Lessig’s account of meaning fidelity is so open-ended as to be almost vacuous. 
For him, under the rubric of “translation,” it would seem that two judges can 
reach entirely opposite understandings about the original meaning of a textual 
provision and its application to modern circumstances, but each be accredited 
with being faithful to the Constitution. This defies any serious defence, especially 
when such a justification is done under the name of constitutional constraint. 
This is exactly what happened in the Citizens United v Federal Election Commission 
case in 2010.60 Both Justice Stevens’ dissent (joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, 
and Sotomayor) and Justice Scalia’s concurrence (joined by Justice Alito and, 
59. See Allan C Hutchinson, Toward an Informal Account of Legal Interpretation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016) ch 5.
60. 558 US 310 (2010).
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in part, by Justice Thomas) claimed to be taking an originalist approach; the 
former emphasized that the framers did not have corporations in mind when 
they guaranteed the right to free speech, whereas the latter argued that there was 
no historical evidence that the framers contemplated that the government could 
restrict the political speech of business corporations.61 Assuming good faith on 
each side, the tie-breaker was more likely not interpretive authenticity, but rather 
ideological resonance. As such, Lessig comes very close to preaching legal theory, 
but condoning political ideology.
When it comes to role fidelity, the political character of this device is even 
more obvious. The basic Lessigian move seems to be that while judges are and 
should generally be faithful to the Constitution’s meaning and “decide cases 
correctly,” they can deviate or abandon that meaning and obligation when role 
fidelity so demands.62 This will be the case even if they sometimes have to decide 
“in one way, even though [they] believe they would decide it differently if they 
didn’t need to worry about the institutional costs to the court.”63 It is difficult to 
appreciate how this balancing of interpretive fidelity and institutional propriety 
can be accomplished without engaging in a similar kind of calculation that 
politicians make and without drawing upon some politically embedded standard 
of what will and will not fly from the public’s point of view. It puts appearance 
and affect above substance and candour.
Examples of this abound in Fidelity and Constraint. Two examples will 
suffice. Lessig’s treatment of the foundational Marbury judgment sets the tone for 
later evaluations. He praises it for its strategic “brilliance” not its legal quality.64 
In “bending” and “dissembling”65 the Constitution (and, thereby, establishing 
the institution of judicial review), he holds that Marshall committed “a sin,” 
but “a beautiful sin.”66 If this kind of rhetorical success and role building is not 
a quintessential political act and achievement, it is hard to know what would 
be. Again, the Supreme Court’s judgment in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v Casey67 and its reluctant refusal to overturn Roe shows how role 
fidelity has been used to eclipse meaning fidelity.68 Although the Supreme Court 
judges were divided on what meaning fidelity demanded, they were relatively 
61. Ibid at 353, 393.
62. Lessig, supra note 2 at 156.
63. Ibid at 157.
64. Ibid at 32.
65. Ibid at 43.
66. Ibid at 33.
67. 505 US 833 (1992).
68. Lessig, supra note 2 at 400-401.
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united on the fact that institutional protection was more important than 
interpretive honesty. None of this is to suggest that such a calculation is inherently 
bad. However, it ill behooves a theorist, like Lessig, to run this argument in the 
name of demonstrating that the Court is not political: “[F]idelity to role forces 
the court to compromise on fidelity to meaning.”69
Accordingly, although claiming to offer a distinctive and defensible 
account of constitutional history and doctrine, Lessig has to shave his theory 
so thin to explain all the twists and turns of constitutional doctrine that it 
becomes insubstantial. It can only encompass all by encompassing anything 
and everything: The constraints of meaning and role become so flexible and so 
loose that they lose any critical bite. The materials of constitutional law are so 
capacious and amorphous that almost anything short of outright manipulation 
or lying is acceptable. After all, if the judgments and decisions of Justices Scalia 
and Thomas, as well as Justices Marshall and Brennan are each and all legitimate, 
then Lessig’s account of constitutional doctrine has little to tell us or recommend. 
Fidelity turns about to be an easy virtue that places no real constraints on what 
constitutional judges can and cannot do and should and should not do. Indeed, 
looking at the constitutional world through a Lessigian lens, it is difficult to 
envisage what would count as playing fast-and-loose or being unfaithful. 
In so many ways, he leaves judges and jurists flapping in the political wind.
V. BLOWING IN THE WIND
So what is the upshot of re-casting Lessig’s account as more accurately one that 
explains how the Supreme Court’s development of constitutional doctrine, 
as a matter of pace and substance, is driven and sustained by politics? And what 
follows if it is accepted, as he phrases it, that “‘what we now understand’ … has 
formed a critical constraint on the evolution of the Supreme Court’s doctrine”?70 
These are important questions that deserve some serious answers. The tone 
of Lessig’s responses seems to be premised on the overriding fear that, if the 
Supreme Court is understood as being engaged in politics, the whole system of 
democratic governance “and the character of the court as a judicial body” will be 
under threat.71 This is a false and unnecessary assumption.
To begin with, it is not at all clear why Lessig feels the analytical compulsion 
to offer a theory that not only provides “an account that fits the data,” but also 
69. Ibid at 256.
70. Ibid at 420.
71. Ibid at 455.
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serves to justify “the practice these data reveal.”72 His project commits him not 
only to incorporate irredeemable cases like Plessy and United States v Cruikshank73 
into his explanatory matrix, but also to defend those decisions as being somehow 
justified or, at least, “understandable” and making “sense in the context within 
which they were rendered.” 74 This justificatory inclusion, albeit begrudgingly 
so, is a very high price to pay for explanatory integrity, especially when he labels 
such decisions, with understatement, as “not good.”75 The effect of this is to 
grant an all-in legitimacy to an adjudicative process that produced these cases 
and, as troublingly, all other future cases that might fit within or conform with 
“what we now understand,” no matter how objectionable or even abominable 
such decisions might be. It is one thing for Lessig to warrant this by noting 
that the Supreme Court should not be expected “to spit in the wind of what 
we all know is true,”76 but it is surely a stretch too far to condone and justify 
such adjudicative handiwork. In avoiding the trap of offering an account of 
constitutional doctrine that is a thinly-veiled story of how it all lines up with the 
theorist’s own political and moral lights (as Dworkin and others do), it is equally 
problematic to offer an account that confers on what is or has been the prized 
imprimatur of what should be.
Also, there is something very unsettling about Lessig’s account of why Supreme 
Court judges should put role fidelity ahead of meaning fidelity—“correctness 
alone is not enough.”77 This leads him to approve a course of judicial action that 
involves foregoing “decid[ing] cases correctly”78 if the institutional costs of doing 
so are too high: “[C]ourts suffer an institutional cost if their judges behave in 
a way that seems political.”79 Apart from seeming to admit that courts do act 
politically, he is recommending that courts hide from the public exactly what 
they are doing and why. In a democracy, this seems a very dubious notion for 
an institution that already has a very suspect legitimacy in society’s eyes. If the 
Supreme Court is to earn or reclaim its necessary claim to moral and political 
authority, it does not seem advisable to deliberately keep the non-elite public in 
the dark. This is a patronizing response and seems to undercut, not undergird, 
the Supreme Court’s standing in a scheme of governance animated by democratic 
72. Ibid at 2.
73. 92 US 542 (1875).
74. Lessig, supra note 2 at 331-32.
75. Ibid at 331.
76. Ibid at 416.
77. Ibid at 156.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid at 157.
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aspirations and public values. Candour and good faith are surely better than a 
closeted dissemblance.
All of this seems to be driven by Lessig’s fear that all will be lost if the 
Supreme Court is seen to be, and actually is, acting in a political way. Although 
he is in good company in being motivated by such a deep anxiety,80 democracy 
will not fall or be irreparably harmed if Supreme Court judges are understood 
to be doing something that is inside, not outside the political fray. Ironically, 
it might be that an open admission that “the Constitution gets read against the 
background of the dominant ideas of any age” that will advance, not impair the 
democratic project.81 Citizens might be assured that their views do count and 
that the Supreme Court is not only acting in society’s best interest, but also doing 
so in a way that respects contemporary society’s views about what is in their best 
interests; direct participation by the people is far superior to indirect mediation 
by elite actors for the people. This is preferable to a Lessigian-informed scheme 
of governance in which its elite institutions rule through professional pretense.
Of course, once the political cat is out of the judicial bag, some changes 
will be necessary. This may or may not involve reducing the final authority of 
the Supreme Court on constitutional matters82 and/or rejigging the process by 
which Supreme Court judges are appointed and hold tenure. However, the real 
and neglected issue on the jurisprudential agenda is not the Supreme Court’s lack 
of democratic legitimacy and the politicization of courts, but the institutional 
failure of other branches of government to address their own democratic foibles 
and failings. If governments and legislatures were more truly responsive to 
popular concerns and more open to popular participation, the question of what 
judges do would be less pressing and more incidental. Consequently, if there 
is a crisis in democracy, it is that it is used more as a rhetorical cloak for elitist 
governmental practice than as a measure and guide for popular politics. It is present 
governmental processes generally, not only judicial review, that fail to satisfy or 
even aspire to the demands of genuine democracy. But there is absolutely no 
warrant to frame the democratic debate as a zero-sum choice between legislatures 
and courts, as presently constituted.
80. Almost all mainstream theorists are so driven. See e.g. Dworkin, supra note 13; Sunstein, 
supra note 13; Fallon, supra note 13.
81. Lessig, supra note 2 at 442.
82. See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (Princeton University 
Press, 1999); Larry D Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial 
Review (Oxford University Press, 2004); Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case Against 
Judicial Review,” (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346. For my own proposals, see Allan C Hutchinson, 
Democracy and Constitutions (A Short Book of Laughter and Forgetting), forthcoming.
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In short, there is a strong case to be made for the creation of multiple possible 
veto points in ensuring the fulfilment of important democratic ambitions about 
the protection of people’s rights and political entitlements. Lessig’s deference to 
“what we now understand” has no democratic valence on its own. While legal 
critics and activists must work with the justificatory tools of their society, they 
are not condemned to work within its past decisions or remain beholden to its 
present orientations. The past consensus is only a starting point and the present 
accord is only a temporary respite from continuing debate and engagement; 
Lessig acknowledges this, even as he fails to act upon it. As such, extant 
democratic arrangements must themselves not only allow, but also encourage and 
facilitate critical engagement. Justificatory standards endure only as long as they 
retain the confidence and support of the community as the best and most useful 
benchmarks available; they thrive and wither in the good-faith debate between 
intelligent interlocutors about what counts as “working best.” Lessig would do 
well to be more mindful of that.
VI. CONCLUSION
Lessig ends Fidelity and Constraint with a plaintive lament for the present fate of 
the Supreme Court. As contemporary politics manages to degrade itself further, 
his worry is that this is infecting the workings and prestige of the Supreme Court. 
As such, Lessig maintains there is “no guarantee that the practice that [Fidelity 
and Constraint]  describes can survive.”83 In particular, he frets that the naked 
politicization of the Court (for example, in judicial appointments) will mean 
that its capacity to transcend partisan politics will be lost and “the effort to keep 
alive commitments thought fundamental therefore could [not] flourish.”84 Yet, 
if the crux of that Lessigian practice is that “the Constitution gets read against 
the background of the dominant ideas of any age,” then, if he is faithful to his 
account, it will likely not only accommodate such a shift, but also will judge it 
to be acceptable.85 That being the case, he will be left with the uncomfortable 
choice of either changing his account of the Supreme Court’s history to give it 
a more substantive and “fundamental” tilt and bite or staying with his account 
and simply taking what comes. Lessig will be, in a manner of speaking, spitting 
into his own wind of constitutional truth in the face of such a political firestorm.
83. Lessig, supra note 2 at 6.
84. Ibid at 458.
85. Ibid 442.
